Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches and Seizures after \u3ci\u3eSoto\u3c/i\u3e by Fagan, Jeffrey & Geller, Amanda
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
2010 
Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches and Seizures after Soto 
Jeffrey Fagan 
Columbia Law School, jfagan@law.columbia.edu 
Amanda Geller 
abg2108@columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jeffrey Fagan & Amanda Geller, Profiling and Consent: Stops, Searches and Seizures after Soto, 5TH 
ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES PAPER (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/1644 
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 










Profiling and Consent:  




Columbia Law School 
Amanda Geller, Ph.D. 






Please address all correspondence to: 
 
Jeffrey Fagan 
Columbia Law School 
435 West 116th Street 
New York, NY  10027 
Tel. 212.854.2624 
Fax  212.854.7946 
Email Jeffrey.Fagan@law.columbia.edu 
 
                                                
∗  This research was supported by Grant No. 16395 from The Atlantic Philanthropies, and 
institutional support from Columbia Law School.  We are grateful to the New Jersey Advisory 
Committee on Police Standards, the Office of the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, 
and the New Jersey State Police for providing the data for this research. Thanks to Rick 
Brooks, Chris Winship and Geoff Alpert for advice in the early stages of this project.  Special 
thanks to Andrew Case for excellent research assistance.  All opinions, conclusions and any 
errors are the responsibility of the authors.  






Following Soto v State (1999), New Jersey was among the first states to enter into a 
comprehensive Consent Decree with the U.S. Department of Justice to end racially 
selective enforcement on the state’s highways. The Consent Decree led to extensive 
reforms in the training and supervision of state police troopers, and the design of 
information technology to monitor the activities of the State Police. Compliance was 
assessed in part on the State’s progress toward the elimination of racial disparities in the 
patterns of highway stops and searches.  We assess compliance by analyzing data on 
257,000 vehicle stops on the New Jersey Turnpike by the state police from 2005-2007, 
the final months of the Consent Decree.  Specifically, we exploit heterogeneity of officer 
and driver race to identify disparities in the probability that stops lead to a search.  We 
assume a crime-minimizing or welfarist rationale for stops, under which race-neutral 
factors are equally likely to motivate stops, regardless of driver or passenger race.  We 
also test a Fairness Presumption (Durlauf, 2006) by comparing search patterns between 
driver-officer pairs where the driver and officer are different races, and a set of race-
neutral benchmarks where the driver and officer are the same race.   
 
Results of fixed effects logistic regressions show that Black and Hispanic drivers, when 
stopped, are more than twice as likely as White drivers to be searched, regardless of 
officer race.  The results also suggest that search patterns vary significantly by officer 
race: Black officers are less likely to conduct a search in the course of a stop than are 
white drivers.  We also see significant interactions between the race of officers and that 
of the drivers they stop: Black drivers are significantly more likely to be searched by 
white officers than they are by black officers; on the other hand, Hispanic drivers are 
significantly less likely to be searched by either black or white officers than they are by 
Hispanic officers.  Racial disparities in the selection of stopped drivers for search suggest 
that despite institutional gains under the Consent Decree in management and 
professionalization, there were no tangible gains in distributional equity.  We review the 
design of the Consent Decree and the accompanying oversight mechanisms to identify 
structural weaknesses in external monitoring and institutional design in the oversight of 
the State Police that compromised the pursuit of equality goals. 




I.  Introduction 
Following Soto v State (1999)1, the U.S. Department of Justice and the State of New 
Jersey entered into a consent decree to settle complaints filed by the DOJ under 42 U.S.C. § 
14141 and 42 U.S.C. § 3789d(c), alleging claims of racial profiling by the troopers of the New 
Jersey State Police (hereafter, NJSP).2  The Consent Decree requires that the troopers not rely on 
the race or national origin of drivers except when they have been given a particular description of 
a driver that included race or national origin, and required documentation of stops and 
managerial review to ensure compliance.3 
New Jersey was among the first states to enter into a comprehensive and far-reaching 
Consent Decree with the U.S. Department of Justice to end racially selective enforcement on the 
state’s highways. The legal claim against the State and the NJSP came at a time when public and 
political awareness of racial profiling had saturated public policy debates on race and policing.4  
Consent decrees has been signed in a handful of municipalities, often to remedy problems of 
excessive use of force and weaknesses in the underlying institutional structures for police 
                                                
1  Soto v. State, 324 N.J. Super. Ct. 66, 351, 1996) (published after the State withdrew its appeal in 1999) 
concluded that "…unrebutted statistical evidence of disproportionate traffic stops against African-
American motorists established de facto policy of targeting blacks for investigation and arrest and thus 
established selective enforcement violating the equal protection and due process clauses.”  In Soto, 
efforts by the State to suppress evidence obtained through race-based stops lead to revelations that New 
Jersey State Police falsified information to hide pervasive racial profiling and the admission by the 
State that police engaged in profiling. 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1996); David 
Kocieniewski, Trenton Charges 2 Troopers with Faking Drivers’ Race, N.Y. Times, Apr. 20, 1999, at 
A23. (“Two state police supervisors said it was common practice for troopers on the turnpike to jot 
down the license plate number of white motorists who were not stopped and use them on the reports of 
blacks who were pulled over.”) 
2  See Consent Decree, United States v. The State of New Jersey, Civ. No. 99-5970 (MLC), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/jerseysa.htm. The Consent Decree was signed on December 
31, 1999. 
3  Id, at provisions 1-5. 
4  See, Jerome Skolnick and Abigail Capolovitz, “Guns, Drugs and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and 
Minimize Racial Profiling,” 43 Arizona Law Review, 413, 419 n. 36 (2001) (reporting that the term 
“racial profiling” first appeared in the American press was in 1987, followed by a small number of 
mentions through 1993, then 31 in 1994 and 1995, 63 in 1996 and 1997, 187 in 1998, over 1,000 in 
1999, and more than 1,000 again in 2000).  A decade earlier, Sheri Lynn Johnson noted the fact of 
racially selective pedestrian and traffic enforcement.  See, Sheri Lynn Johnson, “Race and the Decision 
to Detain a Suspect,” 93 Yale L.J. 214, 236 (1983) ("substantial evidence that many police officers 
believe that minority race indicates a general propensity to commit crime").  By 1999, nearly six 
Americans in 10 (59%) agreed that “racial profiling is widespread.”  Nearly four in 10 (39%) agreed 
that Blacks were “treated less fairly than Whites in dealings with the police.”  See, Gallup 
Organization, Americans See Racial Profiling as Widespread, May 13, 2003, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/8389/americans-see-racial-profiling-widespread.aspx.   
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supervision and training.5 Their goal was nothing less than to bring new police technologies into 
harmony with the constitutional conditions of democratic policing, and to promote police 
accountability at a time of social conflict between police and minority citizens.6 Accordingly, the 
Soto consent decree came at a time of great hopes for the reform of policing practices through 
both constitutional remedies and newly energized political oversight.   
The New Jersey consent decree was signed during a period of passion and anger over a 
series of highly publicized incidents in that state and elsewhere in which African Americans had 
been subject to egregious incidents of discrimination and police violence.7 Racial profiling by 
police on the streets and highways became a prominent feature in the popular and political 
discourse on policing, rivaling the celebration of the “new policing” that had brought lower 
crime rates in several cities.8 This became, then, a moment that promised political accountability 
and institutional change in law enforcement.  Several states initiated data collection procedures 
                                                
5  Debra Livingston, “Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability,” 2 
Buffalo Criminal Law Review 817 (1999); Brandon Garrett, “Standing While Black: Distinguishing 
Lyons in Racial Profiling Cases,” 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1815 (2000).  See, also, Myriam E. Gilles, 
“Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation:  Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil 
Rights,” 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1384, 1388 (2000), proposing that a law be passed permitting the Justice 
Department to deputize private suits against police departments for unconstitutional patterns or 
practices. 
6  David Alan Sklansky, “Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?” 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 567 
(2008); Debra Livingston, “Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing.” 97 Columbia Law Review 551-672 (1997); Brandon Garrett, 
Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 41 (2001-2002).  But see Samuel R. Gross 
and Debra Livingston, “Racial Profiling Under Attack,” 102 Colum. L. Rev. 1413 (2002) 
7  David Kocieniewski, Injured Man Says Brooklyn Officers Tortured Him in Custody, N.Y. Times, Aug. 
13, 1997, at B1.  “Prosecutors are investigating allegations that police officers beat and tortured a man 
while he was in custody at a Brooklyn station house.”); Associated Press, Violence Erupts Again in 
Cincinnati, Officers break up protest over police shooting of black man, Los Angeles Times, Apr.11, 
2001, at A4.  (“The confrontations came four days after Timothy Thomas, 19, was fatally shot as he ran 
from a police officer trying to arrest him on 14 warrants.”); Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 
Shots, And an Unarmed Man is Killed, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1. (“An unarmed West African 
immigrant with no criminal record was killed early yesterday by four New York City police officers 
who fired 41 shots at him in the doorway of his Bronx apartment building, the police said.”); John 
Kifner, Van Shooting Revives Charges of Racial Profiling by Police, New York Times, May 10, 1998 
at B1 (describing incident in which two New Jersey State Police officers fired 11 shots during a traffic 
stop into a van with four non-white males on their way to a basketball event, wounding three males). 
8  Philip B. Heymann, "The New Policing," 28 Fordham Urban Law Journal 407 (2000).  These new 
strategic and institutional designs in policing developed simultaneously with awareness of the 
prominence of race in policing.  See, for example, Jeffrey Goldberg, The Color of Suspicion, 
N.Y.Times Magazine, June 20, 1999 at 51. See, also, Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d at 1188 
(“‘There’s a moving violation that many African Americans know as D.W.B.: Driving While Black.’ 
Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man, New Yorker, Oct. 23, 1995 at 59"); Sean Hecker, Race and 
Pretextual Traffic Stops: an Expanded Role for Civilian Review Board, 28 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 
551-555 (1997)(discussing the abundance of accounts of racial profiling --- “From the New Jersey 
Turnpike to the I-95 corridor between Delaware and Florida, empirical studies strongly suggest that 
police single out minority, particularly African-American, motorists for traffic stops.”). 




that created an empirical foundation for more extensive analysis of police-citizen interactions, 
and the Justice Department promoted local data collection efforts, particularly on highway stops 
and searches, as a way to create dialogue and bring about changes in policy.9  State and local 
actors investigated local police practices, with an eye toward possible constitutional violations.10 
The U.S. Justice Department created a module in its National Crime Victimization Survey to 
develop national population estimates of police-citizen contacts and their outcomes.11  And, of 
course, there was litigation in a handful of states, mostly brought by the Civil Rights Division of 
the U.S. Justice Department.  Several were successful and led to Consent Decrees,12 others 
resulted in Memoranda of Agreement13 detailing specific changes in policy and practice, while 
others led nowhere.14 
                                                
9  Deborah Ramirez, Jack McDevitt, Amy Farrel, A Resource Guide on Racial Profiling Data Collection 
Systems:  Promising Practices and Lessons Learned 84 (2000); Lori Fridell, Racially Biased Policing: 
Guidance for Analyzing Data From Vehicle Stops (2005), available at 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/app/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=232491  
10  Elliott Spitzer, “The New York City Police Department’s ‘Stop and Frisk’ Practices,” Office of the 
New York State Attorney General; available at 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/civil_rights/pdfs/stp_frsk.pdf (Results of Investigation of 175,000 
Terry stops in New York City, January 1998-April 1999, conducted as part of New York Police 
Department “Stop and Frisk” Practices)  
11  See, for example, Contacts between Police and the Public, 2005 (available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=653). This is the most recent report from the 
Police-Public Contact Surveys that were conducted every three years from 1996-2005, generating 
generates epidemiological estimates of the likelihood of a driver being pulled over in a traffic stop and 
the percentage of all contacts that involve the use of force by police based on a nationally 
representative sample of more than 60,000 residents age 16. Information includes the reason for and 
outcome of the contact.  
12  Examples of litigation from 1996 to 2002 that concluded in settlements include: Daniels v. City of New 
York, No. 99 Civ. 1695 SAS, 2001 WL 62893 (S.D.N.Y.) (Certifying class alleging that the Street 
Crimes Unit of the New York City Police Department stopped and frisked tens of thousands of 
predominantly minority New Yorkers without reasonable suspicion); Settlement Agreement, Wilkins v. 
Maryland State Police, Civ. No. MJG-93-468 (D. Md.) Jan. 5, 1995 (creating a consent decree that 
required a halt to an alleged practice of racial profiling on I-95 and data collection in all traffic stops) 
For the text of the consent decrees, see Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, Civ. No. 
00-11769 GAF at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/laconsent.htm; Consent Decree, United 
States v. City of Steubenville, No. C2 97-966 (S.D. Ohio, Sept. 3, 1997), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/steubensa.htm; Consent Decree, United States v. City of 
Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W/D/ Pa., Fed. 26, 1997), at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/documents/pittssa.htm; In re Cincinnati Policing, Case No. C-1-99-317, 
U.S. District Court, Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, Collaborative Agreement, April 21, 
2002, at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-OH-0005-0008.pdf.  For a comprehensive 
repository of civil rights litigation on policing, see Civil Rights Clearinghouse, University of Michigan 
School of Law, at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-OH-0005-0008.pdf. 
13 Examples 
14  See, for example, Chavez v. The Illinois State Police, 1999 WL 593187 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (dismissing case 
alleging that thousands of traffic stops throughout Illinois were motivated by race). 
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In the wake of these and other incidents, Consent Decrees and other instruments designed 
to bring about institutional reform proliferated despite little empirical evidence of the types of 
changes that these agreements could most effectively bring about.  Because of Soto’s important 
place in this history and the broad and deep reach of its remedies, an analysis of the changes that 
it did and didn’t produce opens a unique window to understand the promises and limitations of 
legal regulation and constitutionalized remedies for racially disparate enforcement by police.  
Accordingly, we present evidence of race-specific patterns of enforcement in New Jersey a full 
eight years after the Soto Consent Decree was signed, and at a moment when the State claimed 
success and moved successfully to end federal oversight.   We also locate this analysis in the 
broader scholarly work – legal and empirical - on selective enforcement that has grown over the 
past decade in lockstep with the growth in court supervision of local law enforcement.  Looking 
ahead, this is a cautionary tale about the design of judicial oversight and monitoring, but also of 
the resilience of race-based preferences and practices in everyday policing despite the umbrella 
of oversight and deep institutional changes in the design of policing.   
 
II.  Federal Interventions in Local Law Enforcement under Section 14141 
A.  Federal Litigation as a Strategy for Institutional Reform 
 The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 was the primary litigation 
tool in pursuing remedies for law enforcement violations of citizens’ rights.  The Act, passed in 
the wake of the 1992 Rodney King Riots in Los Angeles,15 authorized the Department of Justice 
to seek injunctions to halt any “pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officials” that 
deprives persons of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or 
laws of the United States.”16  The act was not limited to racial discrimination, but could also 
include police brutality or other types of misconduct.  At the time when it was enacted, §14141 
was potentially a powerful weapon that permitted the Justice Department to eliminate a wide 
range of police misconduct—any “pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement officials” 
that deprives persons of “rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States.”17 Beginning in the mid-1990s, the Department, under 
§14141, crafted consent decrees that became the leading model for not only for remedying racial 
profiling, but for the larger project of institutional reform of the police.18 
 As of December 31, 2009,  24 investigations had reached some kind of formal outcome.19  
At least one other – New Orleans – is likely to produce a formal outcome, though at this writing, 
                                                
15 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a) (1994).  
16  Private litigation and litigation to pursue civil rights claims, §1983 actions, and other claims follow 
separate courses, and are not discussed here.  See, for example, Alexander A. Reinart, Measuring The 
Success Of Bivens Litigation And Its Consequences For The Individual Liability Model, 62 Stan. L. 
Rev. 809 
17  Id. 
18  Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra note 4. 
19 http://www.justice.gov/crt/split/findsettle.php#CRIPAletters 




the timeline is uncertain.20  No investigation has gone to trial.  The complaints under §14141 
typically include excessive use of force and racially biased policing.21 
 Outcomes of investigations under § 14141 generally fall into one of three categories: 
Consent Decrees, Memoranda of Agreement (‘MOA’), or Investigative Finding Letters.22  The 
content of Consent Decrees and MOAs are similar, as if they had been picked from a menu that 
was only sporadically updated.  They include common reforms and usually, the appointment of a 
special monitor.  There are four common elements, though not all are present in every case: (1) 
changes in a department’s use of force policy, (2) improvements in the citizen complaint process, 
(3) the creation of an infrastructure for an Early Intervention System (EIS) to monitor officer 
performance and identify officers whose patterns of interactions with citizens are “inappropriate” 
or illegal or violate departmental policy, and (4) development of improved training methods and 
content. Investigative Findings Letters are narrower, generally confined to one of two specific 
issues, and issuing recommendations without a method to achieve them.23  As such, they are 
advisory only, and rarely is an Independent Monitor appointed.24 Samuel Walker and Morgan 
MacDonald suggest that the uniformity of the design of these settlements reflects a consensus on 
“best practices” to promote police accountability that emerged during the first several years of 
the statute.  The consensus is evident in a Department of Justice report, issued in the last days of 
the Clinton administration in January 2001, that articulated these four prongs of “best practice”.25 
 Monitoring was almost always built into MOAs and Consent Decrees, but not 
Investigative Letters, nor into “stipulated settlements” that result from private litigation.26  
Monitors typically are individuals, firms or ad hoc teams of professional consultants.  Rarely, 
                                                
20 CITE LETTER FROM LANDRIEU 
21 The Bush administration favored Investigative Findings Letters over other tools, and a quick audit of 
the Civil Rights Division website shows a virtual cessation of investigations of law enforcement 
agencies starting in 2001.  See, Walker and MacDonald at 503 and fn 140 for details of the two active 
investigations launched during the Bush administration. 
22 Multiple outcomes are possible within a jurisdiction. Cincinnati, for example, had both a Consent 
Decree for some elements of the redesign of policing in that city as well as a MOA.  See, In re 
Cincinnati Policing, C-1-99-317 (2002) U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15928 (S.D. Phio 2002); Memorandum of 
Agreement between the U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Cincinnati, Ohio and the Cincinnati 
Police Department (April 12, 2002), http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/split/Cincmoafinal.php.  MORE ON 
LINKAGE 
23 For an example, see Rosenbaum letter to City Attorney in Miami March 13, 2003 (CITE) 
24 See, Samuel Walker and Morgan MacDonald, An Alternative Remedy for Police Misconduct: A Model 
State Pattern and Practice Statute, 19 George Mason University Civil Rights Law Journal 479 (2008-9). 
25 U.S. Department of Justice, Principles for Promoting Police Integrity: Examples of Promising Police 
Practices and Policies (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/ojp/186189.pdf.  See, also, Samuel 
Walker, The New World of Police Accountability (2005); Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial 
Profiling, supra note _. 
26 See, for example, Daniels et al. v. City of New York et al., 99 Civ. 1695 (SDNY) (SAS), 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Daniels_StipulationOfSettlement_12_03_0.pdf 
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courts will monitor directly rather than retain a professional or independent monitor.27  Monitors 
generally have prior experience in law enforcement management, in relevant litigation, or in 
oversight of similar institutional reforms in either public or private domains.28  Monitors 
typically review evidence of compliance provided by the state or municipality, and issue reports 
to the Court and/or to the public on progress toward achieving compliance.  They usually work 
through the termination of the Consent Decree or the MOA. This tenure can be critical when 
compliance is partial (or worse), since there usually is no obligation attached to either a Consent 
Decree of a MOA to institutionalize or make permanent any external oversight of the agency.  
Monitors also are usually restricted to the terms and conditions articulated in the Consent 
Decree, and cannot exert any jurisdiction or authority if they become aware of other problems 
such as employment discrimination or corruption.29 
 The duration of monitoring in the first wave of Consent Decrees and MOAs before 2001 
was usually set at five years, though several were extended based on evidence of either 
noncompliance or limited compliance.30  New Jersey’s, as we discuss below, was scheduled to 
expire after seven years, but was extended to 2009 while transitional activities took place.31  The 
monitoring function can be terminated early if a Court terminates a Consent Decree before its 
scheduled expiration.32 
 The design of monitoring in many of the first wave of Consent Decrees and MOAs 
placed heavy responsibility on the monitors, and were quite optimistic about their capacity to 
work as change agents to bring about institutional reform.  Their roles can vary and overlap, 
including collaborators, technical advisors, auditors, “police” to the police, shaming agents, 
analysts, or stern parents.  Their reports, often containing detailed descriptions of the internal 
design and workings of a law enforcement agency, have the ancillary benefit of shining light on 
what often are insular if not closed agencies that resisted any outside inquiry about policy and 
procedure.33  They also served to advance the meta-goal of enhancing accountability that was at 
the heart of both the passage of § 14141 and of the early consent decrees.34  By opening police 
agencies to new forms of democratic oversight, the intervention of federal monitors had the 
aspiration that consent decrees would transcend their formal procedural aims to penetrate the 
                                                
27 Example 
28 See, Section XX, infra, and Appendix A. 
29 Walker and MacDonald, supra note _ at 511.  Example. 
30 LA, Ohio 
31 Infra Section II.B. 
32 Example in Cincinnati 
33 See, for example, Jerome Slolnick and James J. Fyfe, Above the Law (1994); CITES 
34 Debra Livingston, Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice, supra note 5.  
QUOTE 




informal organizational cultures that shapes officers’ everyday conduct on the streets and 
highways.35 
 
B. Racial Profiling in New Jersey and the 1999 Consent Decree 
 In December 1999, the U.S. Department of Justice and the State of New Jersey entered 
into a consent decree to oversee and monitor the enforcement activity of the New Jersey State 
Police in its actions on the state’s highways36.  The consent decree followed the holding in Soto 
v. State that the New Jersey State Police had engaged in a pattern and practice of racially 
selective enforcement on the New Jersey Turnpike.37  Other claims of constitutional violations, 
including excessive use of force, took a back seat to the claims of racially selective enforcement 
by NJSP troopers in the selection of vehicles to be stopped and in the subsequent selection of 
vehicles to be searched.38    
 The Soto consent decree was unique among the early consent decrees enacted in the U.S. 
in the 1990s. Other consent decrees signed in that decade involved claims of civil rights 
violations against municipalities whose police departments were accused of systematic patterns 
of excessive force and other wrongdoing.39  New Jersey was the first to name a state agency, the 
New Jersey State Police.  It put into place a detailed plan for institutional reform in the 
recruitment, training, and supervision of NJSP troopers.  The Consent Decree also required the 
design and implementation of management information system to compile data on the patterns of 
enforcement and the outcomes of vehicle stops and searches. 
                                                
35 See, for example, Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 George 
Washington Law Review 453, 509 (2004) (noting the distinction between procedures aimed at “rotten 
apples” and those aimed at “rotten barrels”). 
36  Consent Decree, United States v. The State of New Jersey, Civ. No. 99-5970(MLC). Full text available 
at: http://www.nj.gov/lps/jointapp.htm  
37  Soto v. State, 324 N.J. Super. 66, 351, 1996) (approved for publication after withdrawal and dismissal 
of the State's appeal on April 22, 1999) (holding that "…unrebutted statistical evidence of 
disproportionate traffic stops against African-American motorists established de facto policy of 
targeting blacks for investigation and arrest and thus established selective enforcement violating the 
equal protection and due process clauses.”) 
38  The Soto court had found that the State and the NJSP troopers were engaged in racial profiling to the 
extent that they were stopping African American motorists on the New Jersey Turnpike at higher rates 
than whites for speeding violations.  Soto, id.  Peter Verniero, Attorney General, Interim Report of the 
State Police Review Team Regarding Allegations of Racial Profiling (1999) (stating that four of ten 
stops were of minorities and eight of ten searches, “the overwhelming majority,” were of minorities). 
See also David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law:  Why “Driving While Black” 
Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265, 277-289 (1999) (reviewing the first comprehensive statistical analysis of 
police stops and race in New Jersey, Maryland and Ohio). 
39  Brandon Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, supra note _.  Debra Livingston, Police Reform, supra 
note _. 
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The Consent Decree required that the NJSP implement new policies and extensive 
reforms in the training and supervision of NJSP troopers, and implemented careful external 
monitoring both of compliance with procedural and substantive reforms.  Compliance also was 
determined by progress toward the elimination of racial disparities in the patterns of NJSP 
vehicle stops and searches on the New Jersey Turnpike that animated the Soto litigation.40  The 
court-appointed Monitor overseeing the Consent Decree for the U.S. District Court published a 
series of 16 reports between ___ and August 2007 documenting the State’s compliance with the 
stipulations of the agreement. Report No. 16, the penultimate report issued in August 2007, 
stated that the State and NJSP had made substantial progress in reducing racial disparities in the 
conduct of vehicle stops, and that the State and the NJSP were in full compliance with the terms, 
conditions, policies, procedures, standards and benchmarks of the Consent Decree.41  
The State was so confident that its compliance record would persuade the Court to end its 
supervision that it began planning for the post-Consent Decree institutional design of the 
reformed State Police even before the Monitor’s 16th report in August 2007.42 In public hearings 
in September 200743, in the Monitor’s August 2007 report,44 the State claimed that the time had 
come to lift the burden of federal oversight from the New Jersey State Police. A bipartisan 
Governor’s Advisory Committee’s on Police Standards and Practices agreed, and echoed the 
conclusion of the Monitor in its final report in December 2007.45 The state’s law enforcement 
institutions reported to the Advisory Commission, quoting the Monitor, that the State had the 
                                                
40  See, __ for details on the specific conditions and requirements set forth in the consent decree, at 
http://www.nj.gov/lps/jointapp.htm 
41  Monitors’ Sixteenth Independent Report, Long-Term Compliance Audit, August 2007, U.S. District 
Court, District of New Jersey, available at: http://www.state.nj.us/lps/monitors-report-16.pdf 
(concluding that: “Compliance requirements are now at 100 percent levels.  Policy, training, 
supervision, inspections and audits….are fully staffed, fully functioning, and, in the opinion of the 
monitors, fully capable of self-monitoring and self-adaptation.”). 
42  An expert report commissioned by the New Jersey State Attorney General and submitted eleven 
months before the Monitor’s August 2007 report, foresaw the Monitors’ conclusions on compliance, 
and issued recommendations that post-Consent Decree monitoring of the NJSP practices be assigned to 
the State Attorney General.  See, Samuel Walker, Memorandum to the Attorney General, State of New 
Jersey, “Post-Consent Decree Oversight of the New Jersey State Police” September 16, 2006 
(concluding that “[t]he NJSP is to be commended for successfully implementing the terms of the 
Consent Decree in a timely fashion.”) (available from authors). 
43  http://www.state.nj.us/acps/home/hearings/070924.html  
44  Supra note __, at iv.  In its 16th and penultimate report, the Monitor noted that “the State Police had 
become ‘self-monitoring’ and that as agency it possessed the ability to “analyze and correct” 
problematic law enforcement procedures on a ‘real time’ basis.”  This was seen by the Advisory 
Committee in its December 2007 Final Report as reliable evidence that the state had created an 
infrastructure that was capable of interalizing the oversight responsibilities that had, under the Consent 
Decree, been assigned to the court-appointed Monitor. 
45  New Jersey Advisory Committee on Police Standards, Report and Recommendations to Governor Jon 
S. Corzine Pursuant to Executive Order No. 29, December 7, 2007, available at: 
http://www.state.nj.us/acps/njacps_final_report.pdf (recommending that “the State join in the motion to 
dismiss the Consent Decree”). 




political will and the infrastructure to assume responsibility for ongoing oversight and 
monitoring of the practices of the NJSP.46 In the 17th and final report before the state was 
released from the consent decree, dated April 2009, the Monitor reiterated the claim from its 
penultimate report that “the State Police had become ‘self-monitoring’ and that as agency it 
possessed the ability to ‘analyze and correct’ problematic law enforcement procedures on a ‘real 
time’ basis.”47 The legislature passed the ___ Act in ___, transferring monitoring and oversight 
of the NJSP to the Office of State Police Affairs within the Office of the State Attorney General.  
The parties to the Consent Decree, the State of New Jersey and the Civil Rights Division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice, filed a joint motion in August 2009 to dissolve the order.48  On 
September 20, 2009, Judge Mary L. Cooper of the U.S. District Court in Newark signed an order 
dissolving the Consent Decree.49 
 
C.  The End of Profiling?   
The independent Monitor, as well as the Attorney General’s expert, focused their reports 
on policy, procedure and practice, rather than addressing the central issue in Soto: whether NJSP 
troopers engaged in race-based selection of vehicles and drivers for stops and potentially 
searches.50 When the Monitor last visited the question of race-specific patterns of enforcement in 
                                                
46  Pinpoint on this in Adv Comm Final Report. 
47 Cite 17th Monitor Report, April 2009. 
48  CITE 
49  Oversight of New Jersey State Police is Ended, New York Times, September 21, 2009, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/22/nyregion/22profile.html. 
50  Neither the Monitor’s reports nor the AG’s Expert Memorandum addressed the basic “supply-side” 
question that was litigated in Soto and that animated the Consent Decree: the racially disparate practice 
of selection of motorists for stops by NJSP troopers on the southern portion of the Turnpike.  In fact, 
none of the monitoring reports addressed the claims of racial disproportionality in the selection of 
vehicles for stops, the primary concern that animated Soto case and the Consent Decree.   
 Yet others did, and offered credible evidence of racial disparities in the selection of vehicles for stops, 
relative to estimates of the base rate of moving violations.  See, John C. Lamberth and Joseph B. 
Kadane, In the Matter of the Study of State Police Stop Activity at the Southern end of the New Jersey 
Turnpike, http://www.state.nj.us/acps/home/hearings/pdf/061121_kadane-lambert.pdf (hereafter, LK 
Report). The LK Report focused on vehicle stops on the section of the New Jersey Turnpike patrolled 
by the Moorestown Station, between Exits 1 and 7A, the area that was the focus of the Soto opinion. 
The LK report analyzed motor vehicle stops by New Jersey State Police (“NJSP”) troopers on the 
southern end of the New Jersey Turnpike in August and September 2005.  LK estimated the 
distribution of the racial and ethnic identity of drivers who exceeded the speed limit, and compared this 
distribution to the distribution of drivers who were stopped by New Jersey State Police troopers in the 
same sections of the New Jersey Turnpike.  The LK Study concluded that NJSP troopers were more 
likely to take enforcement action against black violators than they were against white violators.  Using 
two different measurement methods, they estimated that between 18.5 and 19.0 percent of African-
American motorists committed speeding violations between Exits 1 and 7A of the Turnpike and were 
eligible for stops.  Their analysis of NJSP data on vehicle stops for speeding in the same area showed 
that 30.5 percent of those stopped for speeding were African American.  Tests showed that these 
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Report No. 16,51 he estimated the extent of racial disparities in the outcomes of stops: searches, 
deployment of canine units, and arrests. The analysis was based on a sample of 269 “critical 
event” stops made by NJSP Troops B and E in the second half of 2006.52 No information was 
given on the definition of a “critical event” stop, the method for selecting these cases, or how 
these cases stacked up against the full universe of over 12,200 stops during that time period.53  
Nevertheless, Report No. 16 was cited by the State and the Governor’s Advisory 
Committee as evidence of compliance in its recommendation to seek termination of the Consent 
Decree.  The report concluded that there was no evidence of racial disparity in the conduct of 
NJSP troopers pursuant to stops, despite showing statistically significant differences in the rates 
at which drivers were asked to consent to searches54 and the rates at which canine units were 
deployed for vehicle searches.55  The Monitor minimized the importance of racial disparities in 
post-stop decisions by citing “qualitative” factors that may explain the differences.56  Qualitative 
factors were defined as “levels of discretion” which in turn were equated with reasons for the 
stop or the nature of the violation.  These were categorized as high, median (sic) or low 
discretion events. The Monitor used these categories to classify cases, and then re-analyzed the 
                                                                                                                                                       
differences were statistically significant.  See, also, John Lambert and Joseph B. Kadane, Are Blacks 
Egregious Speeding Violators at Extraordinary Rates in New Jersey? 8 Law, Probability and Risk 69 
(2009). 
 The LK Report was independently reviewed in 2007 at the request of the Governor’s Advisory 
Commission. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Memorandum to James E. Johnson, Lamberth-Kadane Report on 
New Jersey State Police Stop Activity on the Southern End of the New Jersey Turnpike, April 10, 2007, 
available at: http://www.state.nj.us/acps/home/hearings/pdf/dpny_22440631_v1_peerreviewteam.pdf. 
The Panel also examined data on stops and searches during 2005, and included a second window in 
2005 (March-April) as a validity check against seasonality.  The Panel reported that there was no social 
science basis to reject the LK Study, and that the conclusion that racial disparities were present in the 
selection of drivers for stops by NJSP troopers was valid. While the Panel questioned the level of the 
disparity between black and white stop rates reported in the LK Study, it affirmed the likelihood that a 
racial disparity existed.  The Panel concluded that after taking into account any limitations in design 
and measurement introduced uncertainty in the estimates computed by LK, and the confidence intervals 
around the estimates of moving violation rates by Blacks would still suggest that stop rates for Blacks 
are disproportionate to their violation rates and disproportionate to the rates for drivers of other races. 
51  Monitors’ Sixteenth Independent Report, supra note__ ,at 8. 
52 Id.  Troop B patrols state highways in a broad area of northern New Jersey, which encompasses 
primarily rural counties.  rural areas to the north and west of those population centers.  Troop E patrols 
includes three substations whose patrol areas include portions of the New Jersey Turnpike.  The 
Moorestown Station, which was the focus of the Soto litigation, was not included in the Monitors’ 
analysis. 
53  Based on data made available to the authors by the Office of the Attorney General of New Jersey.  We 
used G*Power to estimate the power of a sample of 269 cases and an effect size of .25 for two of the 
three groups.  Power is less than .85. 
54  Monitors’ Sixteenth Independent Report, supra note __ at 14-16. 
55  Id., at 16. 
56  Id., at 20-21 




data on post-stop outcomes to determine the extent of racial disparities conditional on these 
factors. 
Low discretion stops were defined as those “activities that will almost always result in a 
law enforcement response (emphasis in original)”.  Examples of “low discretion” events include 
suspicion of criminal activity, driving under the influence, reckless driving.  Median discretion 
events are those that “usually” result in a law enforcement response, such as following too 
closely, aggressive driving, or undocumented vehicles (e.g., expired registration or license or 
insurance documentation).  High discretion stops include equipment violations such as cracked 
windshields or broken taillights, or other non-speeding moving violations such as improper lane 
changes.  Using this nosology, the Monitor concluded that there was, in fact, no evidence of 
racial discrimination.   
But the evidence for this conclusion leaves open several questions about its reliability and 
accuracy.  First, the post hoc classifications were based on and limited to information available 
to the Monitor that was unobservable in the classification exercise.  There is no reasonable way 
to conclude from the details of the stop reported in the administrative (observational) database 
whether the “guilty characteristic” that motivated the initial action was present and in what form.  
The classification is based mainly on offense categories, not on any behavioral indicia that might 
impart “suspicion” to the trooper.  The robustness of the conclusion depends on the sensitivity of 
the classification scheme.  Even small disagreements and reclassifications could shift the results, 
given the small sample sizes.  Given the importance of “suspicion” as a component of the “high 
discretion” category, and the racial dimensions of suspicion-based actions by legal actors, race 
cannot be excluded as a factor in decisions to search in those discretionary circumstances.57 Post-
hoc outcomes tests of taste-based discrimination are unsatisfactory precisely because of the 
unknown distributions of the unobservable indicia of suspicion that signal the guilt of the 
individual and that might satisfy a preference to search one set of persons over another.  
Second, the sample of stops that did not proceed to a second order interaction were not 
tested, so censoring is potentially a serious problem.  Searches were requested in 146 of the 269 
cases reviewed, and there is no information provided on the rest.  Yet, since the distribution of 
both the observable and unobservable characteristics in the stopped population is censored in the 
analysis, any estimates of the racial distribution of post-stop activities has unknown error rates 
and likely are biased.58  In fact, there is no information available in the administrative dataset 
beyond the rationale for the stop.  Accordingly, the monitors’ report offers no comparisons that 
directly estimate the likelihood of a search within the total sample of vehicles and drivers and 
that allow for control of the observables. 
                                                
57 See, R. Richard Banks et al., Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1169 2006 ___, for a summary.  See, also, R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing 
and the DrugWar, 56 Stan. L. & Policy Review 571 (2003).  See, also, Geoffrey Alpert et al., XXX; 
Sandra Graham and Brian Lowery, XXX;  
58 A quick look at the data in the Monitors’ Report No. 16 shows that Black and White drivers were 
searched in about one in three “high discretion” cases in three where a search is requested, and 
Hispanic drivers are searched in nearly half the cases (47.3%).  Canine units are more than 13 times 
more likely to be deployed in “high discretion stops” of Black and Hispanic drivers compared to White 
drivers. Monitors’ Sixteenth Independent Report, supra note __ at Tables 6 and 7. 
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Third, the classification method assumes a constant motivation of discrimination, and 
interprets the results accordingly.  But not all encounters are motivated by a taste for 
discrimination; not only does the information available to police vary by incident, but so too do 
the motivations for engaging citizens initially, and then to continue the engagement through 
additional activities.  In fact, there is some evidence that when the police officer’s motivation is 
to minimize crime, there is no evidence of racial preferences.59  The motivations could be race-
neutral yet still produce racial disparities, assuming that there is some racial disequilibrium either 
in the indicia of suspicion or in the base rates of illegal behavior.60  This could, in fact, be simply 
statistical discrimination, however unethical it may be to simply “play the base rates,”61 or it 
could be race-based preferences, or a race-based skew how “suspicion” is interpreted.  This 
heterogeneity in preferences interacts with unobservables to make the story more complicated 
than is assumed in a single motivation model. In effect, unobservables shape officers’ 
preferences to search both actual offenders and potential offenders (regardless of guilt).62  
 
D. Discrimination During and After the Consent Decree 
 How then are we to understand the Monitor’s evidence and interpret the claims that NJSP 
officers no longer discriminate? In his 16th report, the Monitor concludes that there are 
significantly higher rates of searches and canine deployments for African Americans who were 
stopped, but minimizes their importance by citing “qualitative” factors that may explain the 
differences. The Monitor avoids a conventional test that uses a common metric for identifying 
disparate treatment of persons in a protected group – comparison of their outcomes with the 
outcomes of persons who are “similarly situated” but in a different group – to assess whether 
non-Whites selected for stops by police are subject to equal probabilities of selection for further 
interactions.63 
 The general test for evidence of disparate treatment is a regression equation that takes the 
form: 
 
Outcome = α + β1* Minority + Σiβi *(Plausible Non-Race Influences) + ε, 
                                                
59 Dominitz and Knowles 
60 Knowles, Persico and Todd, 2001; Persico, 2009 
61 See, for example, Bernard Harcourt, Against Prediction (2006); But see, Risse and Zeckhauser, (2004), 
who defend the practice. 
62  Brock et al., On the Observational Implications of Taste-Based Discriminaliton in Racial Profiling 
(mimeo).  See, also, S. Anwar and H. Fang, “An Alternative Test of Racial Prejudice in Motor Vehicle 
Searches: Theory and Evidence, 96 American Economic Review 127-151 (2006);  K. Antonovics, and 
B. Knight “A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evidence from the Boston Police Department, 91 Review 
of Economics and Statistics163-177 (2009). 
63 See, an illustration, Ian Ayres and Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the 
Los Angeles Police Department, at 5 (October 2008), available at http://www.aclu-
sc.org/documents/view/47.” 




where Outcome is the event or status of interest, Minority is an indicator for the racial 
composition or status of the unit observed (i.e., precinct or person, depending on the outcome), 
Plausible Non-Race Influences are a set of variables representing non-race factors that also might 
influence the outcome, and an error term ε that captures the variation in the outcome that cannot 
be explained by either Minority status or the Non-Race Influences.  These models may include 
non-race influences that are correlated with race, so as to better identify the unique effects of 
race that are present once the influence of proxies for race are removed.64   
 Consider the following example, from Griggs v. Duke Power Co., an employment 
discrimination case.65  In a disparate treatment claim, one could test whether the use of a high 
school diploma requirement biases the hiring process since African American job applicants may 
be less likely to have obtained a high school diploma.  Had this race-correlated control is 
introduced, it would likely have reduced the racial disparity in the hiring rates – for the simple 
reason that minority applicants at that time were less likely to have obtained a high school 
diploma. Should a statistical test control for whether or not an applicant had a high school 
diploma? As Ian Ayres points out,66 in a disparate treatment case, the answer is yes. Under a 
disparate treatment theory, the critical question is whether an applicant’s race was the cause of 
being denied employment. If applicants were rejected because the employer chose not to hire 
diploma-less applicants, the applicants’ race would not be a “motivating factor” in employer’s 
decision.  The goal in specifying these models is to identify the effects of race on outcomes after 
simultaneously considering factors that may be relevant to race.67 
 We conduct precisely such an analysis in this paper. We conduct a series of tests on the 
likelihood of a search or a seizure of contraband pursuant to a search.  We include observables 
based on characteristics of the vehicle and the driver, as well as the nature of the violation.  We 
make no assumptions about preferences or tastes for discrimination, only that there is 
heterogeneity in that preference among officers.  Following Close and Mason68 and Anwar and 
                                                
64 For a general discussion of the specification of regression models to test for disparate treatment, see 
generally D. James Greiner, “Causal Inference in Civil Rights Litigation,” 122 Harvard L. Rev. 533 
(2008).  For a general discussion of how regressions sort out the influences of predictors of an 
outcome, see Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Minimum Standards, 
Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statistics Meet, 36 Stanford L. Rev. 1299 (1984). 
65 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).  Ian Ayres uses this case to illustrate the difference 
between a disparate impact claim, which has limited value in an employment discrimination claim, and 
disparate treatment.  See, See, e.g., Ian Ayres, “Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of 
‘Included Variable Bias’,” Yale Law School Working Paper (2010), available at 
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/ayers/ayresincludedvariablebias.pdf 
66 Ian Ayres and Jonathan Borowsky, A Study of Racially Disparate Outcomes in the Los Angeles Police 
Department, at 5 (October 2008), available at http://www.aclu-sc.org/documents/view/47.” 
67 See, e.g., Ian Ayres, “Testing for Discrimination and the Problem of ‘Included Variable Bias’,” supra 
note _.  See, also, Ian Ayres, “Three Tests for Measuring Unjustified Disparate Impacts in Organ 
Transplantation: The Problem of "Included Variable" Bias,” 48 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 
68 (2005) 
68 Cite 
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Fang,69 we assume that crime minimization is the motivation for policing, but that unobservables 
make it difficult to attribute differentials in searches to a preference for discrimination.  Similar 
to others estimating taste-based discrimination,70 we exploit the observed heterogeneity in police 
officer race to establish search and success rates of suspects of different races across officers of 
different races.  Since the tests are sensitive to assumptions about the purpose of the search – 
crime minimization versus punishment maximization, for example – we focus our analyses on 
the decision to search conditional on a stop.71  
 This also makes sense in light of the institutional contexts in New Jersey, where there 
was “smoking gun” evidence of a preference to discriminate.72  To estimate the influences of 
local NJSP contexts and cultures, given these institutional preferences, we extend our estimates 
to take into account the unique effects of each organizational unit of the NJSP. 
 
III. Theory and Research on Race and Selective Enforcement  
The term “racial profiling” is a broad descriptive category that encompasses a range of 
linked practices by police and other legal actors.  It may include the use of race as a single or 
dominant factor in the decision to stop a person or car, and once stopped, to frisk a citizen, to 
conduct a search of her person or vehicle or passengers in the vehicle, to use noxious and 
intrusive methods for search such as canine deployments, or to use physical force or weapons to 
prevent escalation or aggressive reactions by citizens who have been stopped or detained.  So, 
understanding the role of race in these encounters requires that we consider the role of race not 
just in the initial encounter, but in judgments on whether and how to proceed beyond the initial 
encounter.    
 
Police engage in racial profiling when they select persons of a specific race for attention 
because they assume that those persons are more likely to commit a targeted crime or crime 
generally than a white or majority person.73 The decision to stop a person, then, reflects an a 
                                                
69 Anwar and Fang, supra note _. 
70 Anwar and Fang, Close and Mason, David Bjerk 
71 Dominitz and Knowles, for example, note that assumptions of equilibriums or equal search success 
rates provide a better fit when the goals of enforcement are punishment maximization instead of crime 
minimization.  But given unobservables, the decision about how to model becomes a probabilistic 
notion with unknown contingencies.  At the same time, a finding of equal search rates doesn’t 
necessarily rule out either motivation, nor does it rule out the existence of racial prejudice.  
72 See, Soto v State, supra note 1.  See Veneiro memo, supra note 13. 
73  See, for example, International Association of Chiefs of Police [IACP], 1999; U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 2000).  Skolnick and Caplovitz reduce profiling to its core racial component: the selection of 
individuals for heightened scrutiny based on the color of their skin. See, Jerome Skolnick ___.  Jeffrey 
Fagan et al. show the probability of selection by police for heightened attention (e.g., stop, frisk, 
search) is conditional on both race and neighborhood.  See, Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and 
Broken Windows Revisited: Race and Order Maintenance Policing in a Safe and Changing City, in 




priori probabilistic assessment by police officers that members of a specific race are more likely 
than “similarly situated” members of another race to be engaged in criminal activity, and 
therefore select them for stops.74  But the decision to proceed further may also reflect 
probabilistic judgments about race, or about other factors conditional on suspect race.    
 
Evidence of racial disparity in post-stop outcomes suggests that these probabilistic 
assessments are hardly limited only to the first stage of an encounter, when an individual is 
initially selected for attention.  Racial profiling can occur “when a police officer stops, arrests, 
questions, searches or otherwise investigates a person because the officer believes that members 
of that person’s racial or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit the 
sort of crime that the officer is investigating”.75 So, there may be race-based probabilistic 
assessments inherent in the decision to frisk a person stopped on the street or to search a vehicle 
once that vehicle has been selected.  Perhaps the indicia of suspicion and their algebra change 
from one stage to the next: some indicia that are present in selection for the initial encounter are 
no longer relevant in the decision to proceed further, while other indicia that were not factors in 
the initial decision to launch an encounter enter into the decision logic in later stages.  For 
example, speeding may strongly influence the decision to stop a vehicle, but the speeding may 
have less (if not nothing) to do with the decision to search a vehicle. 76 Yet race may influence 
both the decision to stop the vehicle and to proceed further to a search. Demeanor also may 
signal suspicion, and the subjective interpretation of demeanor as “suspicious” or masking 
                                                                                                                                                       
EXPLORING RACE, ETHNICITY AND POLICING: ESSENTIAL READINGS (S. Rice and M. 
White, eds.) (2010).  
74  Whether racial profiling includes stops resulting from race-based suspect descriptions is controversial. 
Gross and Barnes (2001), Rudovsky (2001), Cole (1999), Kennedy (1997), Davis (1997), Durlauf 
(2006) and several others carefully distinguish such stops from stops based on discretionary judgments 
about suspicion. Case law also distinguishes racial profiling from police stops motivated by race-based 
suspect descriptions. In Brown v. Oneonta (221 F.3d 769, 2nd Cir. 1999), for example, the Court of 
Appeals in the 2nd Circuit found no evidence of an equal protection violation when police stopped over 
200 African- American males (and one woman) in the City of Oneonta based on a suspect description 
provided by a victim of attempted rape. But Richard Banks claims that race-based suspect descriptions 
are no different than other stops motivated by racial classifications. Richard R. Banks, Race-Based 
Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine And Disclosure, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075 
(2001) (showing that by virtue of the similarity of race-based suspect descriptions and race-based 
profiles, both offend the principles of colorblindness in the Equal Protection Clause in that they 
disproportionately burden racial minorities, and both should be subject to strict scrutiny within the 
Fourteenth Amendment). Banks cites four weaknesses in victim-supplied suspect descriptions that 
reduce the targeting of suspects to the same probabilistic (and therefore flawed) determination as in a 
broader race-based profile: (1) the fallacy of appearances of a category of people who resemble the 
suspect, (2) the unreliability of victim descriptions, (3) the overly broad application of the suspect 
description, and (4) the excessive weighting of race in a “multiple factors” suspect description.  
75  Samuel R. Gross and Deborah Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, _ Colum L Rev __ (2002).  
See, also, Samuel R. Gross and Katherine Barnes, Road Work__, __ Mich. L. Rev. __ (2001) 
76  Similarly, in a pedestrian stop, the decision to stop a suspect may reflect subjective judgments about 
behaviors or other indicia that are correlated with crime, but the decision to search that suspect may be 
driven by other factors.  However, the constitutional regulation of the street stop versus the vehicle stop 
are quite different. MORE 
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illegality or signaling culpability may itself be subject to racialized interpretations.77  
 
The linkage between these two probabilistic assessments shows that race and suspicion 
are linked and interact across the stages of an event. These interactions are events, and each 
decision in an event is conditional on the preceding one yet linked by race and perhaps other 
factors.  While that linkage may vary from one stage to the next, the evidence of racial disparities 
both in the selection of cases and what happens following selection suggests the persistent 
infusion of race in the sequence of police-citizen interactions. 
 
Yet researchers studying racial profiling or racially selective enforcement have 
consistently disaggregated this selectivity into two stages of the police-citizen interaction: the 
initial selection of individuals, and the ensuing stages of interaction where police may decide to 
end an encounter or go on to further and more intrusive interdictions.  Compare, for example, the 
analysis by Andrew Gelman and colleagues on the racial distribution of pedestrian stops in New 
York City78 with the analysis by John Knowles, Nicola Persico and Petra Todd of searches and 
“hit rates” pursuant to vehicle stops Maryland.79   Gelman and colleagues analyze pedestrian stop 
rates in New York City by neighborhood, taking into account the crime conditions and racial 
composition of the area, and find racial disparities in stop rates.  Although they acknowledge that 
these disparities may persist in post-stop outcomes, they don’t engage the question of how race 
links from one stage to the next.  Knowles and colleagues do not engage the question of the 
production of stops eligible for search.    
 
To some extent, the separation is understandable.  Different legal, policy and sociological 
questions animate these two sets of studies, for better or worse.  For example, …..Data 
availability also presents challenges to establishing a linkage between base rates of “suspicious” 
behavior and subsequent contacts with police, as does reliable measurements to estimate race-




IV.  Data and Methods 
 
 We test for racial bias in motor vehicle searches conducted by the New Jersey State 
Police over an 18-month period from 2005-7, the final years of the 1999 Soto consent decree.  
We adopt an analytic framework based on recent work by Close and Mason that exploits 
                                                
77  Cites on race and suspiciousness…. Graham, Bridges, Goff, Eberhardt, Banks on profiling research 
78  Gelman, Fagan and Kiss 
79  J. Knowles, Nicola Persico, & Petra Todd, Racial bias in motor vehicle searches: Theory and evidence. 
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 109, 203–299 (2001) 
80  Even reliable measurement may fall short in explaining stops and their outcomes, given the incidence 
of either pretextual or suspicionless stops.  See, >>> 




heterogeneity in officer and suspect race.81  We test the null hypothesis that neither an officer’s 
nor a suspect’s race predicts the probability of a search or seizure, and in turn that no 
combination of officer and suspect race predicts a search.   
 
 
A.  Data 
 
 The NJSP provided incident-level records on 257,059 stops, searches and seizures on the 
New Jersey Turnpike from October 31, 2005 through March 31, 2007.  The data were issued on 
request of the Advisory Commission, as part of its ongoing assessment of compliance by the 
NJSP with the terms of the consent decree.   The data are part of the MAPPS82 system developed 
as one of the obligations of the consent decree.  MAPPS records data generated by troopers 
pursuant to each stop.  Elements include demographics of the driver (but not passengers), 
information about the vehicle stopped, the reason for the stop (moving or non-moving violation), 
and all post-stop interactions (searches, arrests, use of force).  The data are collected for each 
trooper, including the trooper’s demographics, years of service, rank, and unit of deployment. 
 
 Dependent variables are search (binary) and seizure (binary).  Search included those 
conducted based on consent request, searches incidental to arrest, and probable cause searches. 
Searches were conducted in 10,890 stops (4.24%), under several rationales, both constitutional 
and extra-constitutional.  Although searches incidental to arrest were banned in New Jersey 
following State v Eckel, 8313.2% of the searches in the data were conducted under this rationale, 
generally in stops predating the decision.  Most (47.6%) were recorded as probable cause 
searches. Consent searches were 3.7% of all searches, despite the ban on consent searches 
following State v. Carty84. However, there is considerable missing information in the rationale 
for the search, which precluded tests for racial differences by search rationale. 
 
 Seizure was extremely rare: 0.52% of all stops.  Seizure was defined as a stop where 
there was any seizure of contraband.  Details of the seizure in terms of type (e.g., weapons or 
drugs) or amount/value were not made available.  Arrests were made in 3.8% of all stops.  We 
did not analyze arrest as an outcome given its ambiguous meaning relative to the stop itself.  
Some arrests were made pursuant to behavior after the stop, such as resisting arrest or assault on 
a trooper, so we were unable to determine which arrests were made as a result of the detection of 
contraband or other law violations as a result of the stop.   
 
 Predictors included race of driver and trooper, state license plate, trooper years of service, 
and the stop rationale – moving violation or other violation.  For moving violations, information 
                                                
81 Cite 
82 Management Awareness of Personnel Performance.  See, Consent Decree, supra note __, at § 40-56 
83  374 N.J. Super. 91, 2006 
84 790 A.2d 903, 905, 907 (N.J. 2002).  See, also, George C. Thomas III, The Short, Unhappy Life of Consent 
Searches In New Jersey, 36 Rutgers Law Record 1 (2009) 
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on the precise speed was unavailable.85 We assume that out-of-state license plate would be a 
marker of suspicion on an interstate highway, and especially on the Interstate 95 corridor through 
the urban megalopolis of the Northeast, as a potential drug courier and prompt a search. 
 
 
B.  Identification Strategy 
 
Following Close and Mason,86 we test the separate and interactive effects of trooper and 
driver race on the treatment of drivers in the period nearing the end of the Soto consent decree.  
While Close and Mason examined driver-officer racial pairings non-parametrically, we test for 
interactions using a regression framework. 
   
We first test whether the probability that a traffic stop leads to a search (Si) varies by 
driver race.  For each driver i, we estimate Model 1:  
 
 
where DriverRacei is a vector of dummy variables indicating the race of driver i.  We expand 
this model to Model 2, which includes covariates X describing the circumstances of the stop 
(whether the driver is from New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, whether they 




                                                
85 The precise speed might be important to determine the probability of a driver being stopped, but its 
relevance to the probability of being searched is indirect at best.  Assume that a driver whose speed 
exceeds the legal limit by 15 miles per hour is an egregious speeder.  This presents a low discretion 
situation, and the person is more likely to be stopped than would a person traveling at less than five 
miles per  hour above the speed limit. That speed is a high discretion situation.  Persons traveling at 
speeds in between, or 5-15 miles per hour over the speed limit, can reasonably be classified as 
presenting moderate discretion to the detecting trooper.  See, e.g., Joseph B. Kadane and John 
Lamberth, Are Blacks Egregious Speeding Violators at Extraordinary Rates in New Jersey? 8 Law, 
Probability & Risk, 139-152, 2009.  In their analysis of stops on the New Jersey Turnpike, they 
reported that the percentage of Black egregious speeders was only slightly greater (19.0%) than the 
percentage of Black speeders overall.  There is no reason a priori to assume that excessive speed 
signals suspicion to a trooper and thus increase the likelihood of a search. Excessive speeding would 
draw unwanted law enforcement attention, perhaps the last thing that a drug courier on an interstate 
highway (especially I-95) would welcome.  If we assume that drug couriers are sufficiently rational to 
adjust their illegal behavior in light of risk and detection probabilities to reach an equilibrium with 
other drivers, then they are also rational (and smart) enough to avoid attracting attention by excessively 
speeding. 
86 Close and Mason, supra note __. 




 In Model 3, we test whether search probability varies not only by driver race, but also by 
the race and the years of service of the officer making the stop. In each of these models, we 
include fixed effects and a linear time trend for each calendar quarter in the period.  We also 
include fixed effects for the officer’s organizational assignment to account for the distinct 
regions of the state that officers patrol, and to account for the culture and history of each 
station.87  Because of the importance of the Moorestown station in the Soto litigation and 





 To test the extent to which driver and trooper race interact in the determination of stop 





In this model, the coefficient  represents the marginal difference in search probability 
experienced in stops where a driver of race r is stopped by a trooper of race t.  Given R possible 
racial classifications of both driver and trooper, the total number of race interactions included in 
the model is R2.   
To test whether specific driver-trooper race combinations are particularly likely to lead to 
a search, we perform pairwise comparisons of the combinations.  In other words, for each driver-
trooper race combination rt, we use a chi-squared test to compare the differences in the 
coefficients  to the coefficients associated with every other driver-trooper race combination 
.  (either r≠r’ or t≠t’, or both).  To the extent that the chi-squared test indicates a significant 
difference between coefficients   and , we conclude that the relationships identified in 
Model 4 suggest that highway stops with certain driver-officer race combinations are more likely 
to lead to a search than others.  
 
                                                
87 Fixed effects control for heterogeneity in stops and searches by regional deployment of troopers. For 
example, there was a higher percentage of Blacks stopped between Exits 1 and 3 of the Turnpike than 
at exits further north in the patrol area of the Moorestown Station. See, State v. Pedro Soto, A734A. 2d 
350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).  Also, troopers assigned to regular patrols make more stops than 
do their counterparts who work in specialized units.  For example, stops may have been made by 
troopers on special details, such as the “Aggressive Driving Unit” or the “Radar Unit” or the “Tactical 
Patrol Unit.”  Evidence presented in Soto based on traffic tickets suggested that when compared to 
stops by regular patrols, Black motorists were less likely to be stopped by these specialized units.  See, 
State v. Pedro Soto, A734A. 2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996). 
88 Id. 
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Given R possible racial classifications of both driver and trooper, and R2 interaction terms 
included in Model 4, we conduct  pairwise comparisons89. Assuming that there is less 
bias in within-race suspect-driver race combinations, we attribute significance in the differences 
between that estimate and an “off-diagonal” estimate to reflect the marginal influence of race in 
the request for a search. To the extent that interaction terms are dropped from the model due to 
collinearity, the number of pairwise comparisons is decreased accordingly.  For these tests, we 
report the ratio of the odds ratios for the logit coefficient of each pair, and the Chi-square 
significance for the test of the differences in the coefficients.  
The comparison of odds ratios allows us to report information both on the direction of the 
difference as well as its magnitude. So, a ratio of less than 1.0 means that the odds ratio (or 
unexponentiated coefficient) for the “numerator” driver-officer race pairing lower than the 
corresponding coefficient for the “denominator” race pairing.   
 
 
V.  Results 
 
A.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the stops.  This is a universe of all stops by the 
NJSP from October 1, 2005 through March 31, 2007.  Recall that the final Monitor’s Report 
(Report No. 16) was issued in August, 2007, and included an analysis of data from an 
overlapping period in 2006-7.  Most drivers stopped were White (58.4%).  Blacks and Hispanics 
were smaller minorities.   
 
Table 1 Here 
 
 Most officers making stops were White and male, and has been serving in the NJSP for 
more than six years.  Based on data on the race and ethnicity of officers, the NJSP appears to be 
a racially homogeneous policing institution.  More than four stops in five were made by White 
officers.  Black and Hispanic officers made approximately 13% of all stops, and Asian and other 
ethnicity officers made fewer than three percent of all stops.  Note that the officer race measure 
is not a census of officers; many of these stops could be repeat stops by the same officer. Instead, 
this is in effect an exposure model, where drivers of various races are “exposed” to the same 
officer among a group of heterogeneous officers whose population parameters are unknown. 
 
 Most (61.3%) of the vehicles stopped were from New Jersey or New York (14.4%).  
There were few stops made of vehicles registered in Pennsylvania (5.5%).  Stops made of 
vehicles registered in other states along the Interstate 95 corridor were 10.3% of all stops, mostly 
from Virginia (2.09%) and Maryland (3.23%).  Whether this is selection or a weighted 
population estimate given geographical proximity is hard to say.90   
                                                
89 The division by 2 in computing the number of pairwise comparisons is due to the symmetry of the 
comparisons.  The chi-squared tests examine the equality of coefficients; a test of the null hypothesis: 
βrt =βr’t’ is equivalent to a test of the hypothesis βr’t’ =βrt. 
90 Mention linkages of NJ and MD in the profiling cases and also in the two Consent Decrees. 





 Tables 2 and 3 show the distribution of stops and searches by vehicle registration and 
driver race.  Black and Hispanic drivers were searched at far higher rates per stop than were 
White or Other Race drivers.  The orders of magnitude are high – Blacks are searched at nearly 
three times the rate of White drivers, and Hispanics at more than twice the rate.  Other race 
drivers, predominantly Asians or Native Americans, are searched less often than are White 
drivers.  Vehicle searches by state reflect the distribution of stops, with exception of cases where 
the vehicle registration is omitted. Out of state plates from the other non-adjacent states are 
searched in proportion to the frequency with which they are stopped. 
 
Tables 2 and 3 Here 
 
 Figure 1 shows the division of the state into trooper stations. We focus on the 
Moorestown station in portions of this analysis.  NJSP troopers assigned to the Moorestown 
Station patrol the southernmost portion of the Turnpike, from exits 1 to 3.  Readers unfamiliar 
with the state can note that the state’s population centers are in the northern portion of the state, 
from Exit 10 in New Brunswick north to Exit 18 near the intersection with Interstate 80, the 
highway that leads to the George Washington Bridge that connects to New York City. Traffic on 
that portion of the Turnpike is predominantly within-state, or within the “tri-state” region of New 
York, New Jersey and Connecticut.   
 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
 
 In the Southern portion of the state, the traffic is less dense as is the population, and 
vehicles more likely to be transients coming and going from out-of-state.  Beyond any 
demographic mismatch of local drivers in this region with the surrounding population, the focus 
of stops in this portion of the Turnpike on a transient population of out-of-state vehicles is 
consistent with DEA guidelines and other New Jersey institutional preferences on the indicia of 
vehicles potentially trafficking in drugs or other contraband.91  In fact, Moorestown station stops 
of vehicles registered in non-adjacent states along the I-95 corridor were 27.8% of all 
Moorestown stops, compare to fewer than 10% of the total stops.  Maryland registrations alone 
accounted for 10.9% of Moorestown stops, compared to 3.23% statewide. 
 
 The frequency of stops statewide and in Moorestown varies over time, but show a steady 
growth statewide from approximately 37,000 to 50,000 stops over the six calendar quarters that 
we examined.  Stops in Moorestown rose and fell over the six quarters, twice peaking at over 
7,800 stops per quarter before falling again in the next quarter.  Overall, across the six quarters, 
Moorestown stops rose from about 6,900 to 7,700. 
 
Figure 2 Here 
 
  
B.  Race and Searches  
 
                                                
91 DEA Guidelines CITE.  CITE Veneiro memoranda, acknowledgement of DEA training materials 
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 We estimated a series of logistic regressions to identify the contributions of race of both 
driver and officer to the probability of being searched.  Models were estimated for the statewide 
set of cases and also for the Moorestown subset.  
 
 The models in Table 4 contrast the effects of driver race with the combined effects of 
driver and trooper race on the probability of a search. We estimate these models with and 
without fixed effects for NJSP organizational unit to estimate the influences of both location and 
local culture. Additional models use a global measure of mismatch in officer/driver race.  We 
then include driver race with the mismatch variable to determine if mismatches have effects that 
are neutral with respect to driver race.  The tables show the odds ratio (the exponentiated logit 
coefficient) for ease of interpretation, together with the standard error for the unexponentiated 
parameter estimate. 
 
Table 4 Here 
 
 Driver race alone predicts the probability of a search.  We omitted the White driver 
category for reference.  The results are substantively the same with and without fixed effects for 
organizational unit, though the coefficients are slightly higher.  In models 1 and 2, Black drivers 
are more than 2.8 times more likely to be searched than White drivers.  Latino drivers are more 
than 2.5 times more likely to be searched than White drivers.  Drivers of other races, primarily 
Asians, are significantly less likely than Whites to be searched.  When we add in covariates for 
the characteristics of the vehicle and the officer, including officer race, these results remain 
substantively the same.  There is a slight decline in the odds ratio for Latino drivers, but it 
remains significant. There is a slight increase in the odds ratio for Black drivers once we control 
for officer race and other factors.  Stops for reasons other than moving violations are far more 
likely to lead to searches.  The vague category of “other reasons” leads to searches nearly 15 
times more than stops for moving violations, suggesting that these stops may in fact be pretexts 
to conduct a search absent some other codified reason for the stop. 
 
 The results for officer race in Table 4 are significant only for Black officers, and the odds 
ratio is .812. This suggests that Black officers are nearly 20% less likely to conduct a search 
given a stop, compared to their White counterparts.  Other officer races were not significant.  
One way to interpret this effect is simply that Black officers have a higher threshold of 
“suspicion” when making a stop and deciding whether to conduct a search, or they may have 
equal suspicion to White officers but are more temperate in their exercise of discretion. 
 
 Models 5 and 6 suggest that a driver-officer race mismatch is less likely to result in a 
search, and that is consistent even after controlling for driver race.  Black and Latino drivers are 
still more likely to be searched than are White drivers and other race drivers, even when 
mismatch is added to the models.  The odds ratios are consistent with the magnitudes in Models 
3 and 4, suggesting that the driver race finding is robust to specifications that take into account 
the race of the officer.   
 
 So far, then, there is fairly strong evidence that Black and Latino drivers are subject to 
search more often than are White and other race drivers. Table 5 shows results of specific models 
for each driver race, which begins the process of identifying specific officer-driver race 




combinations that might produce differences in search probabilities.  The models are specified 
both with and without fixed effects for organizational unit and calendar quarter.  Results are 
similar though not identical for these alternate specifications.   
 
Table 5 Here 
 
 White drivers are less likely to be searched by Black officers compared to White officers, 
but only without controls for organizational unit.   Overall, Black officers are neutral compared 
to their White counterparts to search drivers, regardless of driver race.  The odds ratios are well 
below 1.0, although most specifications are not significant.  Hispanic officers are slightly more 
likely to search White drivers than other drivers (OR=1.123, p < .050) compared to White 
officers, but that is the only condition where their search probability is significantly different 
than White officers.   
 
 Other race officers (again, mostly Asian) are less likely to search White and Latino 
drivers, and more likely to search Black drivers.  Their OR for searching other race drivers is 
astonishingly low (.032), suggesting the virtual absence of searches. 
 
 All drivers are far more likely to be searched if stopped for the vague category of “other 
stop reasons,” and less likely to be searched if their vehicle is registered in NY compared to New 
Jersey of Pennsylvania. Finally, troopers with fewer years of service are more likely to conduct 
searches of all drivers, suggesting that discretion may come with experience and, perhaps, less 
need for engaging in the types of enforcement that are status-enhancing in the eyes of their 
professional peers. 
 
 The results for stops made by officers assigned to the Moorestown station are nearly 
identical to stops made elsewhere. Whatever else the Consent Decree may or may not have 
accomplished, it did produce consistency between this unit and the others in the state.  
Unfortunately, the pattern of results in Table 6 suggests that Moorestown stops continue the 
pattern of racial discrimination that was evident before the Consent Decree, and the rest of the 
NJSP troopers appear now engage in similar patterns of racially selective enforcement.  
 
Table 6 Here 
 
  Models 1 and 2 in Table 6 shows that Black and Hispanic drivers, compared to White 
drivers, are three times more likely to be searched. Again, searches in the “other reason” stop 
category are many times more likely to take place compared to moving violations stops.  The 
race-specific officer trends suggest Black officers are about 30% less likely to conduct searches 
in Moorestown compared to White officers, regardless of driver race.  Their preference for 
search is lower across the board, though there are differences by driver race within their negative 
preferences.  Again, we cannot disentangle the reasons for their lower search rate in 
Moorestown, and it could be that their threshold for suspicion is higher or their taste for 
discrimination lower.  Unlike Black troopers in Moorestown, Latino and other race officers in 
Moorestown have similar search propensities compared to White troopers.  
 
 Table 7 shows tests for specific combinations of officer-driver race combinations.  The 
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statewide set of cases and the Moorestown subsample were analyzed separately. To generate 
these coefficients, we introduced dummy variables for each driver-officer race combination.  We 
omitted the other race driver/other race officer category as the reference, since it is very small 
category and drops out of the models.  The regressions in Table 7 shows only the odds ratio for 
each combination, and the standard error for the unexponentiated regression coefficient.  All 
models were estimated with controls for reason for the stop, state of the vehicle’s registration, 
and trooper years of service. Table 7a includes unit fixed effects. 
 
Tables 7a and 7b Here 
 
 Comparing the odds ratios in the columns of Table 7a, searches of Black drivers were 
three to five times more likely to occur compared to searches of White drivers.  Officer race did 
not modify the race-specific search odds.  Searches of Latino drivers were also far more likely 
than searches of White driver, ranging from about twice as likely for Black officers to more than 
three times more likely for Latino officers.  
 
 Patterns in Moorestown suggest a different and more racially distinct set of search 
practices.  White officers were three times more likely to search Black and Latino drivers in 
Moorestown, but Black officers in the Moorestown station were no more likely to search Black 
or Latino drivers than they were to search White drivers.  Latino officers were more likely to 
search Latino drivers and Black drivers, though the large odds ratio for that comparison (2.421) 
was not significant.  Other race officers in Moorestown were strongly inclined to search Black 
drivers, but not drivers of other races.  The patterns in Table 7b suggest that conditions in 
Moorestown have changed little in the decade between the Soto research in 1996 and the closing 
months of federal oversight in 2006-7.  
 
  
C. Pairwise Comparisons and Differences 
 
 We conducted a series of pairwise comparisons to identify in more detail differences in 
officer-driver race interactions in search probabilities.  We modified the logistic regression 
models in Table 7 to include specific pairwises test of each driver-officer race combination, and 
conducted a set of chi-square tests for the differences in parameter estimates for each 
combination.  To help in interpretation, we report two statistics from these tests. First is simply 
the significance of the bivariate test, or p(Chi-square).  Next, the numerical values in the tables 
are the ratios of the odds ratios for each pair to provide information on the magnitude and 
direction of the differences.  A ratio greater than 1.0 indicates that the ratio for the pair in the row 
is greater than the odds ratio for the pair in the column. So, whereas Table 7 reports the odds 
ratio of each combination, Table 8 reports the ratio of the separate odds ratios for each of the two 
driver-officer race combinations.  This statistic is similar to a comparison of excess risk ratios in 
epidemiology, and allows the comparison of two race pairings’ risk to each other, rather than to a 
previously designated reference group.92 
                                                
92 Kenneth Rothman, Sander Greenland, and Timothy L. Lash, Modern Epidemiology (2008);   See, also, 
Sana Loue, Sana Loue, Epidemiological Causation in the Legal Context: Substance and Procedures, in 
(J. Gastwirth, ed.) Statistical Science in the Courtroom 254 (2000); A. Laupacis, D.L. Sackett, and RS 
Roberts, An Assessment of Clinically Useful Measures of the Consequences of Treatment. 318 N Engl 





 Excess risk measures the association between a specified risk factor (in this case, 
driver/officer race combination) and a specified outcome (the probability of being searched).  
While epidemiologists generally report differences, here we report the ratio of the two odds 
ratios.  It is the ratio between two proportions—in epidemiology it's typically defined to be the 
difference between the proportion of subjects in a population with a particular disease who were 
exposed to a specified risk factor (P(D|E)) and the proportion of subjects with that same disease 
who were not exposed. Here, we substitute ratio for difference.  
 
Table 8 Here 
 
 Ratios greater than 2.0 are highlighted in the table in bold, and consider these to be 
meaningful differences.  Many other differences achieve statistical significance, but in a large set 
of cases, this may simply be differences without substantive meaning.  The 2.0 odds ratio 
threshold reflects a standard of causation in tort law where courts have recognized that risk can at 
some threshold translate into causal inference.93  We also highlight (in italics) ratios of less than 
.5, which suggest a meaningful difference in the opposite direction (i.e., where the odds ratio of 
the column pair more than twice exceeds the odds ratio in the row pair).  Because the chi-squared 
tests reflected in Table 8 are tests for equality, and are therefore symmetric, Table 8 has a similar 
symmetry, where odds ratios of 2.0 or greater have “reflecting” odds ratios of .5 or less when the 
comparison is reversed. 
 
 The results in Table 8 confirm what we observed in the previous tables.  Nearly every 
pair that comparing a Black or Latino driver to a White driver has a ratio of odds ratios greater 
than 2.0.  These patterns hold regardless of the officer race.  Similarly, nearly every comparison 
with a White driver suggests that they are significantly less likely to be searched regardless of the 
race of the officer.  Remember that these are pairwise comparisons, so that each one of these 





                                                                                                                                                       
J Med 1728-33 (1988); Bruce Levin and Michael O. Finkelstein, Statistics for Lawyers (2002); Lee 
Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 Univ. Chic. L. Rev. 1 (2002). 
93 See, Landrigan v. Celotex, 127 N.J. 404; 605 A.2d 1079 (1992) (stating that “Without expressly 
adopting a specific standard, the court cited with approval several cases that adopted a requirement that 
an epidemiological study show a relative risk in excess of 2.0 to prove that causation in a specific 
individual was more probable than not. The significance of a relative risk greater than 2.0 representing 
a true causal relationship is that the ratio evidences an attributable risk of more than fifty percent, 
which means that more than half of the cases of the studied disease in a comparable population exposed 
to the substance are attributable to that exposure. This finding could support an inference that the 
exposure was the probable cause of the disease in a specific member of the exposed population.”)  See, 
also, Sana Loue, supra note _; Levin and Finkelstein, supra note __; Carl Cranor, Regulating Toxic 
Substances: A Philosophy of Science and the Law 1 (1993).  
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D.  Summary 
 
 We used a series of regressions to estimate the extent to which there was differential 
treatment of drivers of different races by the New Jersey State Police in the closing months of a 
lengthy period of federal oversight and monitoring of their activities.  Our metric of differential 
treatment was the request for a search conditional on being stopped, an indicator of suspicion 
that would animate the second stage inquiry of a vehicle search.  We exploit the heterogeneity of 
officer-driver race combinations to identify the magnitude of any observed differences.    
 
 We developed consistent evidence of racially selective enforcement, with Blacks and 
Latinos more likely to be searched compared to White drivers.  Officer race effects vary 
according to the specification, but in general, White officers have a greater propensity to stop 
non-White drivers.  We also see evidence that Black officers are more likely to cabin discretion 
and/or employ a different or higher threshold of suspicion before conducting a search.   In 
general, the coefficients for Black officers in predicting search were lower in nearly all 
conditions than were the regression parameters for White, Latino or Other Race officers. These 
results were robust to several different specifications, including tests that included factors related 
to the vehicle and controlling for the officer’s length of service (and therefore, maturity and 
experience). 
 
 We verified these results using two forms of pairwise tests: one test that examined the 
likelihood of a search given permutations of officer-driver race combinations, and a second that 
tested each of these permutations against each other.  In both instances, we observe significantly 
higher search probabilities for Black and Latino drivers compared to White and Other Race 
drivers, regardless of the race of the officer.  Conversely, we found significantly lower rates of 
search requests for White drivers, regardless of officer race.  Assuming that same-race officer-
driver combinations were the least biased condition, every other condition testing the marginal 
effect of driver race in predicting a search. So, while at the means, White drivers are more 
inclined to request searches than Black officers, these effects disappear at the margins when we 
control for officer-driver race combinations and directly compete them to determine relative risk, 
or what is known in epidemiology as excess risk.  These results also were robust to several 
covariates. 
 
 Of course, these differentials may reflect unobservables attendant to either the stop itself 
(e.g., whether the driver is an “egregious” speeder who exceed the speed limit by more than 15 
miles per hour) or to observables (but not quantifiables) during the stop, such as demeanor, 
condition of the automobile, passengers, and other factors that may be correlated with race.  
Inchoate suspicion may be hidden or signaled but not defined in a way that trooper can 
categorize, and we see this at work in the very large effects we observe when we control for a 
dummy variable about whether the basis for the stop was “other.”  To see how this distributes bu 
driver race, we estimated this condition against a baseline of stops for moving violations.  The 
effects are consistently large and significant: “other reason” is more likely to be invoked with 
Black drivers (OR=1.44) and Latino (OR=1.64) compared to White drivers.  There are no 
significant differences in the use of this category by officer race.  These differentials suggest the 
importance of indicia of suspicion and discretion that are not “articulable” and thus pose some 
constitutional dilemmas in terms of contemporary expressions of “reasonable suspicion” that 






 Since searches are conditional on stops, we also should consider as a conditioning 
process the results from the Advisory Committee’s deliberations on new evidence of racial 
selection of drivers for stops.94  When we couple robust evidence of race differences in search 
requests with the LK results on race differentials in the selection of drivers for stops, we find a 
compounding of bias in stops that defies the terms and conditions of the Consent Decree.  We 
turn next to the institutional and structural architecture of the Consent Decree, and place it in 
context of the larger set of Consent Decrees and MOAs, to explain the persistence of racially 




VI. The Soto Consent Decree and the Institutional Design of Oversight 
 
A. The challenge in any effort for institutional reform of policing is the design of procedures 
and policies that can effectively manage police discretion.  This requires measures that 
minimize both “rotten apples” and replaces the institutional environment that produced them. 
(Armacost).   
 
B. But the design of Soto and other consent decrees suggests that even if we are better at 
managing discretion, there is a residual component of discretion that is beyond the reach of 
training, oversight, and professionalization.  The challenge for both leadership, monitors, and 
social scientists is to identify the moving parts of racially biased policing that seem to evade 
institutional reforms.  
 
C. So, given the brief history of the impacts of consent decrees, the Soto experience becomes an 
important case study on legal regulation of policing.  Soto was an exceptionally well crafted 
design --- DETAILS.  Any limitations of Soto are likely to pop up in future consent decrees 
that repeat this design. 
 
So, we ask why did discriminatory patterns persist in the wake of the Soto, and are there flaws in 
the design of the Consent Decree that could achieve positives in all but the critical benchmark of 
racially disparate treatment? 
 
– Design of the Consent Decree itself 
– Weaknesses in the monitoring function – looking in the wrong places, weak 
analyses 
– Less than full disclosure in the reporting of data, perhaps problems were always 
present but undetected because the monitor lacked the chops to do so. 
– Sociology of monitoring, narrowing of cognitive frames for oversight 
– Networks of monitors undermines “independence” – defeats the broader goals of 
democratic regulation that co-exists with legal regulation 
 
                                                
94 LK study, supra note __. 
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D. Why the failure to benchmark police accountability?  Why not a disparate treatment test 
as a routinized dimension of monitoring?  What are we afraid of? 
 
E. Prospects for legal regulation are dim.  While we move toward an evidence-base in a broad 
range of social policies, from medicine to criminal justice, the reluctance to impose harder 
benchmarks in this context is puzzling.  We instead look to procedure, training and 
professionalization as a remedy to factors that may operate outside of those structures, and 
may result from cognitive or unconscious processes that are unlikely to be reshaped by 
focusing on reifying professional standards of conduct  
 
F. Seeking an alternative – democratic regulation, scientific as well as professional oversight, 
use of social framework models, and taking seriously the notion of democratic accountability 
and citizen participation.  See  Fung on Chiago CAPS, other perspectives on CAPS (Skogan), 
San Diego (Cordner), Boston Ten Point Coalition, other examples.  Move beyond policing to 
other domains, including environmental regulation and education.  See Dorf and Sabel 










Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics (Mean, SD) 
      
Race (%) Drivers  Troopers 
White 58.40 (49.28)  84.55 (36.14) 
Black 19.97 (39.97)  4.43 (20.57) 
Hispanic 13.21 (33.87)  8.56 (27.97) 
Asian 4.50 (20.72)  1.12 (10.51) 
American Indian 0.68 (8.24)  1.26 (11.16) 
Pacific Islander 2.45 (15.44)  0 0.00  
Unknown 0.79 (8.86)  0 0.00  
      
Gender (%)      
Male 77.14 (41.99)  97.18 (16.57) 
Female 22.86   2.82  
      
Age 35.29 (12.65)    
      
Years of Service    6.28 (4.58) 
      
Vehicle Registration      
New Jersey 61.28 (48.71)    
New York 14.42 (35.13)    
Pennsylvania 5.48 (22.77)    
Other Out-of-State 15.63 (36.31)    
Missing 3.19 (17.57)    
      
Reason for Stop      
Moving Violation 89.02 (31.27)    
Non-Moving Violation 9.68 (29.57)    
Other 1.30 (11.33)      
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Figure 1.  New Jersey State Police Patrol Sectors
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Table 2. Stops and Searches by Driver Race, New Jersey State Police, October 2005- 
March 2007  
  Driver Race  
 Total White Black Hispanic Other  
N of stops  257,059   150,131   51,325   33,970   21,633   
% of All Stops 100.0  58.4  20.0  13.2  8.4   
       
N of searches  10,890   4,400   3,829   2,235  426  
% Searched 4.2  2.9  7.5  6.6  2.0   
       
       
       
       
       
Table 3. Stops and Searches by Vehicle Registration, New Jersey State Police, October 2005- March 
2007 
  Vehicle Registration  
 Total New Jersey New York Pennsylvania Other Missing 
N of stops 257,059 157,531 37,069 14,096 40,168 8,195 
% of All Stops 100 61.3  14.4  5.5  15.6  3.2  
       
N of searches 10,890 6,537 823 644 1,435 1,451 
% Searched 100 60.0  7.6  5.9  13.2  13.3  
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Table 5.  Logistic Regression of Race-Specific Search Probability by Trooper Characteristics, Stop Characteristics, and 
Vehicle Characteristics (Odds Ratio, SE) 
Model (1) (2)   (3) (4)   (5) (6)   (5) (6) 
            
Predictors White Drivers   Black Drivers   Hispanic Drivers   
Other Race/Ethnicity 
Drivers 
            
Constant 0.039 0.033  0.118 0.089  0.092 0.097  0.035 0.770 
 (0.032)** (0.058)**  (0.037)** (0.061)** (0.048)** (0.068)**  (0.102)** (0.196) 
Trooper Years of Service 0.931 0.964  0.916 0.933  0.916 0.950  0.906 0.928 
 (0.004)** (0.005)**  (0.005)** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.007)**  (0.015)** (0.016)** 
Stop - Non-moving Violation 2.550 2.924  3.093 3.108  1.863 2.052  2.010 2.335 
 (0.043)** (0.044)**  (0.043)** (0.044)** (0.058)** (0.060)**  (0.138)** (0.145)** 
Stop - Other Reason 24.288 21.200  11.336 10.044  13.749 12.730  19.279 18.728 
 (0.056)** (0.059)**  (0.075)** (0.078)** (0.087)** (0.091)**  (0.160)** (0.169)** 
Vehicle - New York 0.538 0.564  0.432 0.437  0.708 0.679  0.531 0.460 
 (0.062)** (0.062)**  (0.067)** (0.068)** (0.079)** (0.080)**  (0.152)** (0.154)** 
Vehicle - Pennsylvania 1.012 1.096  0.875 0.940  1.573 1.499  0.400 0.407 
 (0.071) (0.073)  (0.076) (0.078)  (0.081)** (0.083)**  (0.297)** (0.301)** 
Vehicle - Other Non-NJ 0.611 0.744  0.624 0.672  1.017 1.023  0.494 0.526 
 (0.058)** (0.061)**  (0.046)** (0.050)** (0.062) (0.066)  (0.158)** (0.165)** 
Trooper - Hispanic 1.015 1.123  0.942 1.007  1.039 1.025  0.792 1.266 
 (0.056) (0.058)*  (0.061) (0.063)  (0.074) (0.076)  (0.190) (0.287) 
Trooper - Other 0.755 0.782  1.379 1.302  0.882 0.829  1.284 0.032 
 (0.117)* (0.119)*  (0.092)** (0.093)** (0.140) (0.141)  (0.282) (0.156)** 
Trooper - Black 0.810 0.874  0.856 0.865  0.811 0.738  0.567 0.525 
  (0.088)* (0.089)   (0.085) (0.086)   (0.114) (0.115)**   (0.283)* (0.287)* 
            
Observations 150,018 145,642  51,259 49,755  33,951 32,404  21,609 17,532 
            
Unit FE? No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
 
 




Table 6.  Logistic Regression of Search Probability by Driver Race, Trooper Characteristics, Stop 
Characteristics, and Vehicle Characteristics: Moorestown Unit (Odds Ratio, SE) 














       
Constant .024 .039 .031 .139 .117 .049 
 (0.046)** (0.070)** (0.107)** (0.086)** (0.138)** (0.307)** 
Driver - Black 2.986 3.149     
 (0.058)** (0.059)**     
Driver - Hispanic 3.174 3.155     
 (0.071)** (0.073)**     
Driver - Other Race .689 .736     
 (0.132)** (0.134)*     
Trooper Years of Service  .901 .945 .884 .901 .796 
  (0.010)** (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.021)** (0.066)** 
Stop - Non-moving Violation  2.392 2.326 2.344 2.575 2.612 
  (0.075)** (0.136)** (0.113)** (0.166)** (0.426)* 
Stop - Other Reason  18.412 32.819 9.689 25.053 23.220 
  (0.103)** (0.179)** (0.159)** (0.224)** (0.439)** 
Vehicle - New York  .491 .449 .436 .707 .464 
  (0.087)** (0.183)** (0.125)** (0.183) (0.386)* 
Vehicle - Pennsylvania  .892 1.213 .843 .764 .424 
  (0.092) (0.156) (0.140) (0.209) (0.538) 
Vehicle - Other Non-NJ  .709 .676 .711 .770 .434 
  (0.059)** (0.118)** (0.081)** -0.135 (0.324)** 
Trooper - Black  .597 .754 .490 .235 1.885 
  (0.135)** (0.234) (0.206)** (0.514)** (0.397) 
Trooper - Hispanic  .912 .987 .844 1.151  
  (0.107) (0.195) (0.158) (0.221)  
Trooper - Other  1.174 .808 1.548 .787 1.618 
   (0.095) (0.219) (0.123)** (0.242) (0.479) 
       
Observations 42,837 42,837 20,180 13,421 5,236 3,850 
       
Significance: * = p < .05, ** = p < .01      
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Appendix A.  Monitor Function Key 
 
Key: 
§ 14141 Suit 
§ 14141 Investigation – consent decree before lawsuit 
§ 1983 Suit 
State AG or Municipal Suit 
 
A.  Private Monitoring by Security Firms 
Detroit – 2003 – Sheryl Robinson Wood – removed by judge for misconduct in 2009, 
replaced by Robert Warshaw (see below) 
Los Angeles – 2001 – Michael Cherkasky (NYCDA, Kroll), deputy Jeff Schlanger (NYC 
DA, private practice, private investigation firm purchased by Kroll) – extended in 2006, 
final report in 2009 with unfulfilled issues (including racial profiling) to be taken on by 
Office of the Inspector General 
 
Austin – 2007 – Kroll hired to audit an IAB report of a shooting. Team, led by Jeff 
Schlanger, found that the police officer had failed to follow protocol before the shooting, 
but did not rule on the shooting itself, seconding the findings of the IAB investigation. 
Pennsylvania – 2003 – Investigation at request of Governor Rendell to determine 
department’s compliance with new sexual harassment policy. Four reports issued over 
one year by Sheryl Robinson Wood, concluding that the department was in compliance 
 
 
B.  DOJ Monitoring its own agreements 
Buffalo – 2002 – no evidence of DOJ followup and no notice that monitoring has ended 
Cleveland – 2004 – One-year period of DOJ full unrestricted access – nothing published 
or granted afterwards 
Montgomery Co. MD – 2000 – Agreement required annual reporting on racial 
breakdown of traffic stops. After first year, no reports made public. No action by DOJ. 
Mt. Prospect, IL – 2003 – MOU to end investigation, department must file a report with 
DOJ every six months. No public documentation of such reports available. 
Villa Rica, GA – 2003 – DOJ investigated and entered in an MOU stating that Villa Rica 
needed to assign an auditor to oversee compliance with racial profiling policy. No info on 
DOJ website, PARC, or Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse suggesting that a monitor 
was ever selected. 
 
C.  Individual Monitors – Private Practice Attorneys 
Cincinnati – 2002 Saul Green (Former US Atty, in private practice in 2002, now Deputy 
Mayor of Detroit) – Joseph Brann is deputy monitor 
District of Columbia – 1999 (by request of department) – Michael Bromwich (SDNY, 
OIC, Inspector General of DOJ, Fried Frank) – in 2008 Bromwich stated DC was in 
compliance with 80% of the 126 substantive provisions. 
US Virgin Islands – 2009 – Michael Bromwich appointed and issued one very critical 
report in May 2010. It is not clear who is monitoring the USVI now that Bromwich has 




taken a position in the Obama administration. 
 
D.  Private Monitoring Firms 
Pittsburgh – 1997 – Police Management Resources (James Ginger). Nineteen quarterly 
reports issued, through 2002, when the decree was lifted. 
New Jersey – 1999 – Police Management Resources (James Ginger). Final report in 
April 2009 states department has become “self-monitoring” and consent decree lifted in 
September 2009. 
Oakland – 2003 – Four-person team (two former police officials from other cities, two 
civil rights attorneys) appointed to oversee 52 “tasks” in settlement. Decree extended for 
failure to comply in 2007. Team issued 14 reports over five years. Team replaced by 
Robert Warshak and Police Performance Solutions 
Prince George’s County – 2004 – Complaints of excessive force by Canine Unit. Initially 
DOJ monitored, issuing joint reports. Contracted with The Alexander Group, a 
subdivision of MPRI, part of L3 (international military contractor), which issued reports 
until January 15, 2009, when consent decree was lifted. 
Riverside, CA – 2001 – State AG suit, stipulated that state AG could hire a consultant. 
State AG hired Joseph Brann, the former police chief of Santa Ana and Saul Green’s 
deputy in Cincinnati. Brann had his own private consulting firm at the time, and now runs 
Public Strategies Group, a government consulting firm. 
Steubenville, OH – 1997 – DOJ chose Charles Reynolds. At the time, he did not appear 
to work at a consulting firm, though he later joined Police Management Resources and 
then co-founded Police Performance Solutions. No public reports by this auditor are 
available. 
Walkill, NY – 2001 – Suit by NY State OAG requiring implementation of screening and 
performance monitoring. OAG and Walkill agreed on Dean Esserman (NYU law, NYC 
ADA, General Counsel to the Transit Police for Bratton, Assistant Chief for the New 
Haven Police, Chief of Stamford Police). Since being appointed, he became chief of 
Providence, RI. He issued four annual reports, asking for six additional months of 
monitoring before stating that the department was in compliance in January 2006. 
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Key figures in the Network of Monitors 
 
Robert Warshaw—former Chief of Police in Rochester, former Associate Director of Office of 
National Drug Control Policy. Senior Associate of Simeone Associates, one of three partners in 
Police Performance Solutions. 
 
Charles Reynolds—former Chief of Police of five towns, including Lebanon and Dover NH. He 
served as the Independent Auditor for Steubenville, OH decree. His bio states that he served on 
monitoring team in New Jersey and Prince Georges’s County, suggesting that he worked at 
Police Management Resources. He is one of three partners in Police Performance Solutions. 
 
Joseph Wolfinger—former Assistant Director of Training for the FBI, one of three partners in 
Police Performance Solutions. 
 
Kroll Executives – Schlanger, Cherkasksy 
 
James Ginger – Former Deputy Director of the Police Foundation, founders of Police 
Management Resources. 
 
